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Almost 50 years after the European Court of Justice clearly established the supremacy of 
Community law, the question regarding the primacy of law within the European context remains 
unresolved. By exploring the perspectives of the ECJ and the German Federal Constitutional Court, 
this article seeks to outline the controversies relating to constitutional supremacy and analyses the 
theoretical underpinnings of this difference. It will be suggested that by focussing only on select 
liberal democratic principles, each court not only constructs their respective claims to supremacy, 
but they do so in opposition to each other. Thus rather than creating constitutional integration 
throughout the European Union, the supremacy discourse has created fault lines along which 
further tension may arise. By drawing on Kumm’s theory this paper will conclude by suggesting an 
alternative lens through which such conflicts may be resolved. 
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Since the beginnings of European economic integration, in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, the European Union (EU) has evolved to become a new type of 
polity which cannot be categorised as either a sovereign state or an international 
organisation.2
 
 This political and economic union has posed unique challenges to 
European and national institutions as they attempt to navigate this new territory 
using traditional conceptual tools. One such challenge that has been the subject of 
significant intellectual debate, is that of the relationship between EU law and 
national law. Almost 50 years after the European Court of Justice (ECJ) clearly 
established the supremacy of Community law, the question regarding the primacy of 
law within the European context remains unresolved.  
This article will explore the controversy surrounding constitutional supremacy by 
comparing the perspectives of the ECJ and the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(FCC) on this issue. By outlining the conceptual foundation on which claims to 
constitutional primacy lay, this paper will reveal an alternative method for 
addressing such issues. Firstly it will be argued that the European monist position of 
the ECJ is grounded in a desire to promote the rule of law at a European level. In 
contrast, the German FCC’s position may be termed a democratic statist approach, as 
it invokes its own constitution as the ultimate source of legitimacy, which is derived 
from the German demos. However by analysing the theoretical underpinnings on 
which this approach rests, this article will reveal its weaknesses. It will be suggested 
that by focussing only on select liberal democratic principles, each court not only 
constructs their respective claims to supremacy, but they do so in opposition to the 
                                                 
1 Vanessa McGlynn has recently completed her degree in International Studies and Law at the University of New 
South Wales, Sydney. She is the winner of the postgraduate section of the CESAA Essay Competition, 2010. 
2 P. Craig and G. De Burca (eds), EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
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other. Thus, rather than creating constitutional integration throughout the European 
Union, the supremacy discourse has created fault lines along which further tension 
may arise. Accordingly, this paper will draw on Kumm’s theory to suggest an 
alternative lens through which such questions may be explored. By debunking the 
theories on which the current approaches rest, Kumm draws on the common 
normativity of both legal orders to create a holistic framework in which courts can 
engage with conflict issues through the balancing of relevant principles.  
 
Although there were no provisions dealing with supremacy of Community law over 
national law in the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty, the ECJ 
addressed this issue early in its jurisprudence.3 The court enunciated the conceptual 
basis of EU law supremacy in the case of Costa,4
 
 before subsequently expanding its 
ambit.  
In Costa, the court adopted a European monist position by arguing that supremacy 
of Community law was necessary to ensure its effective and uniform application, so 
as to maintain the coherent legal order that the treaties sought to establish.5 It was 
held that through the ratification of the EEC Treaty, Member States created a new 
legal order by transferring to the new Community institutions “real powers stemming 
from a limitation of sovereignty.”6
 
 Moreover, given the Treaty’s aims were 
integration and co-operation between members, to accord primacy to domestic law 
would be to undermine those aims. Accordingly this case may be understood as the 
ECJ drawing on the notion of an autonomous legal order, which promotes the 
realisation of the rule of law beyond state boundaries, as a conceptual basis for 
granting EU law supremacy.   
This idea of EU supremacy was subsequently extended in the cases of Internationale 
Handeslgesellschaft7 and Simmenthal8. In Handeslgesellschaft the ECJ rejected the 
argument that fundamental rights enshrined in the German constitution could be 
invoked to invalidate EU law. The court indicated that allowing recourse to national 
rules would impede the uniform applicability and efficacy of Community law.9
 
 
Consequently, the ECJ maintained that not even fundamental rights expressed in a 
national constitution could provide a limit to EU law.  
The court reaffirmed this position in Simmenthal, by upholding the primacy of EU 
law over the Italian constitution. However the ECJ also broadened the ambit of this 
doctrine by requiring all national courts that apply EU law to set aside conflicting 
national legislation.10
                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 344. 
 This is of particular significance for many member States as 
often, only the national Constitutional Court has the power to decide on the 
constitutionality of national law. However in Simmenthal the ECJ held that any court 
with jurisdiction to apply Community law is under a duty to give full effect to those 
4 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
5 M. Kumm ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe? Three conceptions of the relationship 
between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice,’ Common Market Law 
Review, Vol. 36, 1999, pp. 354-355. 
6 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
7 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1970] ECR 1125. 
8 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629. 
9 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[1970] ECR 1125. 
10 P. Allot, ‘Supremacy of European Community Law,’ The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1979 p. 21. 
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provisions, and must refuse to apply national legislation in the event of a conflict.11
 
 
Thus inferior courts are not required to conform to national processes and submit 
questions of conflicting legislation to the Constitutional Court for judgment.  
Accordingly, by 1978 the ECJ had firmly established the primacy of EU law. The 
court has used the skeletal provisions in the foundation treaties to consistently 
maintain the supremacy of EU law over national law, whatever its nature, so that 
national constitutions could not be invoked as a limitation on the applicability of 
European legislation.12
 
 Moreover national courts at every level were granted the 
power, by the ECJ, to set aside national legislation in the event of a conflict with EU 
law, despite existing national court hierarchies that reserved such a role for the 
highest constitutional court. The ECJ justified the supremacy of EU law by drawing 
on the liberal ideal of the rule of law at a supranational a level, and the necessity of 
effective and uniform application of EU law to ensure a functional common market. 
Yet can it be accepted that the ECJ has settled the issue? To unquestioningly accept 
its decisions regarding supremacy would be to impute to it a normative authority to 
decide such issues. However any justification of such imputation would resurrect the 
question of the proper interpretation of the Treaty-constituted order, and in turn 
resurrect the issues which the ECJ has been said to have authoritatively 
determined.13 While self-referentiality is a characteristic of most legal orders, in that 
the highest legal authority can appeal to no higher confirmation of its authority than 
that expressed in its own jurisprudence, such circularity of reasoning provides little 
guidance in a situation in which the very position of highest legal authority is itself at 
stake.14 Given that the highest tribunals of Member States also belong to normative 
orders in which they claim ultimate legal authority, the intersection of these legal 
orders necessarily creates a bi-dimensional framework in which questions of 
supremacy arise.15 Accordingly, the ECJ’s elaboration of EU supremacy is but the 
first dimension. It is only when the courts of Member States accept the ECJ’s 
perspective that the primacy of European law can be held to be settled.16
Consequently this article will now explore the position of Member State courts to 
determine whether the second dimension of the bi-dimensional framework of 
supremacy is met. This analysis will proceed along the four lines of potential 
constitutional conflict between EU law and national law. That is, contention about 
the supremacy of EU law can arise in four different areas from the perspective of 
Member States. Firstly, the Member State court must determine whether it accepts 
the general primacy of EU law over national law. Secondly, should it accept this 
general proposition, the conceptual basis on which it is accepted must be identified. 
Contention will occur if the national court accepts EU supremacy for reasons other 
than those expressed by the ECJ in Costa.
  
17
                                                 
11 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629. 
 Thirdly, conflict may arise should the 
Member State court impose limits on its acceptance of supremacy, so that its 
national constitution restricts the application of conflicting EU law. Finally 
constitutional conflict may manifest itself in questions of judicial review. While the 
12 N. MacCormick, ‘Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?,’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3, 
1998, p. 520. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., p. 521. 
15 J. Weiler, ‘The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism,’ Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 
1, 1981, pp. 275 - 276. 
16 Ibid., pp. 275-276. 
17 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
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ECJ maintains that it has the exclusive power to review and invalidate Union acts 
which are ultra vires,18
 
 a national court claiming that it is the ultimate arbiter of such 
questions will lie in opposition to the ECJ perspective. 
Having established the framework of potential constitutional conflict through which 
a court’s jurisprudence may be understood, this article will now use this framework 
to examine the position of the German FCC. The German position has been identified 
as an informative example for this analysis as Germany has not only been a Member 
State since the inception of the European legal order, but its highest court has also 
developed a rich body of doctrine dealing with supremacy issues.19 Accordingly, 
German case law engages with each of the four lines of constitutional conflict 
outlined in the above framework. Therefore it provides a pertinent example of how 
such issues are resolved, thereby illuminating the concerns faced by other Member 
States. This is of particular value given that even original Member States, such as 
France, have not yet been required to adjudicate conflicts in all four areas.20
 
  
The original position of the German FCC was expounded in the case of Solange I,21 in 
response to the ECJ ruling in Handeslgesellschaft.22 As outlined above, in 
Handeslgesellschaft the ECJ held that the supremacy of Community law applied to 
all national law, notwithstanding its status. As such a fundamental principle under 
the German constitution could not be invoked to challenge the primacy of 
Community law. On receiving this ruling, the German Administrative Court 
submitted the case to the German FCC on the grounds that article 24 of the German 
Constitution, which allows for the transfer of legislative power to international 
organisations, could not provide the basis for an inter-state organisation to override 
the Constitution. The FCC held that even though article 24 of the Constitution 
permits the transfer of sovereign rights to inter-state institutions through treaty 
ratification, it does not leave open the opportunity to amend the Constitution by 
foregoing the formal process.23 Accordingly article 24 nullifies any amendment to the 
EEC Treaty which would destroy the identity of the German Constitution, by denying 
citizens the protection afforded to them by the basic rights enshrined in their 
Constitution.24 In reaching this conclusion the FCC emphasised the need for national 
courts to act as a check on Community law, in light of the limited protection of rights 
provided at the European level.25 Therefore the highest German court refused to 
recognise the unconditional supremacy of EU law, but rather emphasised the 
primacy of fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution in cases of conflict.26
 
  
                                                 
18 Case 314/85 Firma Foto Frost v Hauptzollant Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199. 
19 Kumm, Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe? Three conceptions of the relationship between 
the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, op. cit., p. 352. 
20 Craig and De Burca, op. cit., p. 354. 
21 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1974] 2 
CMLR 540. 
22 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. 
23 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1974] 2 
CMLR 540. 
24 W. Roth, ‘The application of Community Law in West Germany: 1980-1990,’ Common Market Law Review, 
Vol. 28,  1991, pp. 137, 142. 
25 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1974] 2 
CMLR 540. 
26 N. Reich, ‘Judge-made ‘Europe á la carte’: Some Remarks on Recent Conflicts between European and German 
Constitutional Law Provoked by the Banana Litigation,’ European Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, 1996, pp. 
103-104. 
CESAA Essay Prize Winners, ANZJES 2(2)/3(1) 
 
78 
While the Solange I decision illustrates the strong position the German FCC adopted 
in relation to the first expressions of EU law supremacy, case law since has 
demonstrated that the court has assumed a more deferential stance. In 1987 the 
court passed its Solange II decision in which it reconsidered the primacy issue.27 The 
distinguishing factor in this case was the extent to which the Community institutions, 
including the ECJ, had adopted a fundamental rights discourse through which basic 
rights were adequately protected.28
 
 The FCC held that:  
“in view of these developments, so long as the European Communities and 
in particular the case law of the European court, generally ensured an 
effective protection of fundamental rights…which is to be regarded as 
substantially similar to the protection of fundamental rights required 
unconditionally by the Constitution, the FCC will no longer exercise its 
jurisdiction to…review legislation by the standard of the fundamental 
rights contained in the Constitution.”29
 
  
Accordingly, while this statement indicates that the FCC has retreated from its 
original position in relation to the primacy of EU law, it cannot be understood as the 
recognition of unconditional supremacy. The court is cautious not to surrender its 
jurisdiction, it merely states that it will not exercise this jurisdiction, provided rights 
protection at the EU level is maintained.30 The court preserves its final authority to 
use the German Constitution as a means of nullifying EU legislation.31
 
  
The Maastricht decision reiterated the position outlined in Solange II in relation to 
fundamental rights protection, albeit in slightly different terms.32 This case 
concerned a challenge to the constitutionality of Germany’s ratification of the Treaty 
of the European Union (TEU). While the FCC held that ratification was compatible 
with the Constitution, it made several important comments regarding the 
relationship between the national court and the ECJ. It affirmed Germany’s status as 
a sovereign state and emphasised that it would not relinquish its power to decide on 
the compatibility of Community law with the fundamental rights outlined in the 
German Constitution.33 However it replaced the “no jurisdiction, so long as”34 test 
expressed in Solange II, with the “jurisdiction, but exercised in a relationship of co-
operation with the ECJ” formula.35 However the practical significance of this 
amendment is limited in relation to the question of supremacy.36
 
 The new test 
preserves the FCC’s jurisdiction, provided for in Solange II, to review and nullify EU 
law in situations of conflict.  
                                                 
27 Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft [1987] 3 CMLR 225. 
28 Roth, op. cit., p. 143. 
29 Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft [1987] 3 CMLR 225. 
30 Kumm, Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe? Three conceptions of the relationship between 
the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, op. cit., p. 363. 
31 Craig and De Burca op. cit., p. 359. 
32 Brunner v The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
33 Brunner v The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
34 Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft [1987] 3 CMLR 225. 
35 Brunner v The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
36 Kumm, Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe? Three conceptions of the relationship between 
the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, op. cit., p. 369. 
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Moreover the court also used this case to describe its perception of its own role 
within the European legal order. It stated that national courts are to exercise a power 
of review over Community competences, so that should the Community act ultra 
vires, that is, attempt to exercise powers which are not clearly provided for in the 
treaties, a national court may rule that the Community had no legal basis to perform 
such act.37 Accordingly, the act would be held void for lack of competence. Of 
particular importance is the German court’s retention of its power of review of the 
ECJ’s decisions. So that should the ECJ itself act ultra vires in handing down a 
decision which would qualify as a an amendment to the Treaty, the FCC retains the 
position as the ultimate arbiter of constitutionality, empowered to strike down the 
ECJ’s finding as applicable law in Germany.38
 
 
Having established the German FCC’s position in relation to supremacy, it is now 
possible to contrast this perspective with that of the ECJ using the lens provided by 
the above constitutional conflict framework. While the FCC accepts the primacy of 
EU law, it does so only where there is no conflict with the German Constitution and 
in circumstances where there is no question relating to competence. Accordingly it 
does not accept the view, propounded by the ECJ, that EU law is unconditionally 
supreme. Moreover, where it does accept the primacy of EU law, the conceptual basis 
on which this acceptance derives, is article 24 of the German Constitution.39 Thus it 
is not that Germany’s ratification of the treaty created an autonomous European 
legal order, as put forward by the ECJ in Costa,40 but rather it is Germany’s internal 
legal regime which creates the foundation on which supremacy is grounded.41
 
  
Furthermore the FCC’s stance in relation to supremacy also diverges from the ECJ’s 
view with regards to the two final lines of potential conflict. Firstly, it has continued 
to assert its jurisdiction where EU law impinges on fundamental rights protection by 
the Constitution. This is so notwithstanding the ECJ’s judgment in 
Handelsgesellschaft42
 
 which maintained that EU law supremacy applied even to 
national constitutions. Finally the FCC has asserted itself as the ultimate arbiter of 
constitutional conflict so that it retains the power to review and adjudicate questions 
of ECJ jurisdiction.  
Accordingly the second dimension of the bi-dimensional framework of supremacy is 
not met. Although the German FCC accepts the primacy of EU law generally, its 
understanding of what constitutes this supremacy stands in contrast to the position 
of the ECJ. Germany’s acceptance of EU law primacy is not only limited by 
constitutional constraints, but the conceptual foundation for such acceptance is 
firmly rooted in the German legal regime. Thus while the practical consequences of 
the German FCC’s decisions may not differ dramatically to the ECJ’s, because the 
national court has accepted EU law primacy, it does so only by accommodating the 
concept of supremacy within its own national legal framework. Accordingly the 
theoretical backgrounds, against which each court develops its understanding of 
                                                 
37 Brunner v The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
38 Kumm, Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe? Three conceptions of the relationship between 
the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, op. cit., p. 364. 
39 Roth, op. cit., p. 142. 
40 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
41 N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 110. 
42 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. 
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supremacy, stand in opposition to each other, thus creating a tension at the 
theoretical level which has the potential to evolve into practical manifestations of the 
conflict in the future.  
 
By exploring the differing perspectives of EU law primacy held by the ECJ and the 
German FCC, this paper has identified the conceptual sphere as the locus for 
constitutional conflict. However it is only by moving beyond the identification of the 
differing approaches of these courts, to reveal the theoretical underpinnings of such 
difference, that the source of the conflict may be understood, and thus resolved.  
 
Accordingly this article will examine the traditional theoretical approach to 
supremacy to determine whether the underpinnings on which it rests provide a 
strong foundation for national courts to mount their primacy arguments. Kumm 
argues that the position reached by the German FCC is the “consequence of adopting 
a conception of democratic statism as a normative framework and constructive 
starting point.”43 This traditional approach of democratic statism does not provide a 
judge, faced with constitutional conflict, with a toolkit to address such issues, but 
rather points to the national constitution as the framework within which such 
questions are to be resolved. This position is adopted because supremacy of the 
national constitution is said to be a defining feature of the practice of national law.44 
Therefore judges are required to determine outcomes within the internal system by 
reference to the constitution which is the ‘ultimate legal rule.’ Questions about 
whether the constitution should in fact be the ultimate legal rule, lie beyond the 
scope of legal decision making.45
It may be questioned whether it is valid to maintain that legal practice is defined by 
national constitutional supremacy as the ultimate legal rule, so that judges cannot 
engage with constitutional conflict issues.
   
 
46 National constitutional supremacy may 
only be a defining feature of the practice of national law, if the set of rules which 
determine what is to count as law, includes the rule of national constitutional 
supremacy. However law is not a practice that is defined by its rules.47 The ultimate 
legal rule is a defining feature of legal practice “only so long as it is recognised as 
such by its participants.”48
 
 Therefore if the participants of the German legal practice 
begin to recognise European constitutional supremacy, the national constitution will 
become displaced as the defining rule of the German system.  
This argument appears to refute the idea that judges must accept the framework in 
which they operate, without questioning why such a framework should be adopted. 
However if legal reasoning is to be defined as the application of rules, which are 
constituted by an ultimate set of rules, to resolve issues, then the decision about what 
should be the ultimate rule cannot be resolved through legal reasoning.49
                                                 
43 Kumm, Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe? Three conceptions of the relationship between 
the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, op. cit., p. 365. 
 By framing 
the resolution of constitutional conflict as the search for an ultimate legal rule, it 
44 N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism,’ The Modern Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 3, 2002, pp. 317, 340. 
45 M. Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after 
the Constitutional Treaty,’ European Law Journal Vol. 11, No. 3, 2005, p.270. 
46 Ibid., p. 271. 
47 Walker, op. cit., 340. 
48 Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after 
the Constitutional Treaty, op. cit., p. 273. 
49 Ibid., p. 273. 
CESAA Essay Prize Winners, ANZJES 2(2)/3(1) 
81 
becomes conceptually impossible for the law to provide guidance as to whether 
national constitutional supremacy or European supremacy should be the ultimate 
legal rule.50
 
 It is a legal non-issue according to this theory. 
Consequently the traditional approach of searching for an ultimate source of 
legitimacy puts the question of which constitutional supremacy to adopt, beyond the 
scope of legal reasoning. Firstly, it denies judges the opportunity to engage with the 
issue by requiring them to resolve issues by reference to the internal legal order, as 
confined by the national constitution. But even a critique of this approach, which 
questions the blind adoption of a particular ultimate legal rule, defines itself out of 
resolving constitutional conflict issues within the legal sphere, because the critique 
itself sees the resolution of the issue as stemming from the adoption of some form of 
ultimate legal rule.  
 
Accordingly the democratic statist approach is forced to identify an alternate 
ultimate source of legitimacy for the national constitution, if it is to continue to assert 
national constitutional supremacy. This approach has sought to locate this source of 
legitimacy of the national system by reference to the idea of ‘we the people’ as the 
original constituent power establishing the constitution.51 The demos is understood 
as the normative basis for the supremacy of the constitution as it is the entity which 
firstly creates the constitutional system and then practices self-determination within 
the constitutional framework it established.52
 
 Thus the people are the source of 
legitimacy on which national constitutional supremacy is said to rest.  
Applying this theory to the German context, the FCC asserts its jurisdiction to nullify 
EU law on the basis that it is either inconsistent with German fundamental rights 
enshrined in the German constitution, or that it is ultra vires, thus beyond the scope 
of the treaties which were ratified through the power conferred by the Constitution. 
It is the German Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, that legitimises the 
court’s stance. The democratic statist approach provides the foundation on which 
Germany can adopt this position, as the theory identifies national constitutional 
supremacy as the defining feature of the national legal order, derived from the 
ultimate source of legitimacy of the demos.  
 
However does this theoretical foundation provide adequate grounding to sustain the 
FCC’s position, in opposition to the ECJ? There are two critiques of the traditional 
approach to supremacy which undermine the two theoretical bases on which it 
stands. Firstly, democratic statism requires national courts to confine themselves to 
the doctrine of national constitutional supremacy on the basis that the constitution is 
the defining feature of national law. However if the quest is not framed in terms of a 
search for the ‘ultimate legal authority,’ this position cannot be maintained. If 
instead one adopts Kumm’s position that constraint on legal reasoning defines the 
institutional limits of the role of courts, then the supremacy of national constitutions 
does not necessarily follow.53
                                                 
50 Ibid., p. 274. 
 It is only if national constitutional supremacy could be 
51 J. Weiler, ‘The European Courts of Justice: Beyond ‘Beyond Doctrine’ or the Legitimacy Crisis of European 
Constitutionalism’ in A. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J. H. H. Weiler (eds), The European Court and National 
Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence 1998, p. 381. 
52 Kumm, Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe? Three conceptions of the relationship between 
the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, op. cit., p. 367. 
53 Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after 
the Constitutional Treaty, op. cit., p. 282. 
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identified as such a constraint, that the claim that EU law takes precedence over 
national constitutional law would be so at odds with existing practice that it would 
disqualify such a claim as being within the confines of the practice of national law.54 
However given the realities of the current system, in which EU law has penetrated 
national legal orders to the point that it is unquestionably superior to at least the 
national statutes, it is implausible to claim that asserting the supremacy of EU law is 
not an identifiable claim within the national practice of law.55
 
 It would be merely 
another step towards legal integration. Consequently by framing the practice of law 
as being institutionally constrained by certain features, rather than a practice 
governed by an ultimate legal rule, national constitutional supremacy cannot be 
presented as a defining constraint of national law, thus it cannot be adopted to assert 
that constitutional conflicts are legal non-issues. A national constitution is not 
supreme merely by virtue of its position as a constitution. 
While democratic statism overcomes this argument by relying on the ultimate source 
of legitimacy being derived from the demos, the second critique demonstrates that 
this justification does not support an argument for national constitutional supremacy 
alone. According to democratic statism, if a polity may only qualify as a state if the 
demos establishes its sovereignty through the adoption of a constitution, then “the 
concept of demos is analytically tied to the constitution of a sovereign state 
establishing a supreme legal authority.”56 Consequently, there can only be one 
demos, otherwise the legal authority it established could not be supreme. Therefore 
in a multi-polity, such as the EU and Germany, the question becomes at what level is 
the demos located?57 By framing it in this manner, it becomes evident that those 
advocating European supremacy may also use this conceptual justification to support 
their claim. Just as the German demos may be said to have willed the German 
constitution into existence, the EU may be established by a European constituent 
power, based on the a European demos.58
 
 Accordingly, the notion of a constitution, 
derived from the will of the people, cannot provide the necessary theoretical 
underpinning for national constitutional supremacy.  
An exploration of the traditional approach to supremacy reveals the tenuous 
theoretical grounds on which it rests. Rather than providing judges with the 
conceptual tools to deal with constitutional conflict, this theory denies them access to 
such inquiries, by confining them to resolving such conflicts within the boundaries of 
the constitution. However, while democratic statism lacks a strong theoretical 
foundation, the practical implications of this theory cause greater concern. By 
framing questions as a search for the ‘ultimate legal rule,’ this theory necessarily 
requires the resolution of constitutional conflict to be in terms of the domination of 
one legal order over the other. As such, select liberal democratic principles are 
invoked by both courts to bolster their claim to supremacy to the exclusion of other 
relevant considerations. Accordingly notions of fundamental rights and democratic 
self-governance are used by national courts to promote their claim to primacy, while 
the ECJ focuses on the importance of establishing the rule of law at a supranational 
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level. Yet neither court incorporates the principles relied on by the other. Thus the 
current conceptual foundations on which the supremacy discourse is based, 
necessarily place national courts in direct conflict with the ECJ, in which the 




Given the traditional approach to supremacy is neither strongly theoretically 
grounded, nor practically desirable, an alternative conceptual approach to 
constitutional conflict should be adopted. This article will outline Kumm’s alternative 
approach which draws on the limitations revealed from democratic statism as a 
foundation for creating a more holistic conceptual framework.  
 
The foundation for this approach stems from the first critique of democratic statism. 
Rather than searching for an ultimate legal rule, this theory adopts the idea that the 
institutional role of courts is defined by constraint. However this constraint is neither 
national nor European constitutional law, but rather ‘legal practice as a whole.’61 
That is, judges are not confined to either constitutional order, but rather they seek 
guidance from them both. By framing constraint in this manner, this theory appeals 
to the common normativity between all legal practices. It is based on the principles 




While at first glance it may appear impossible to identify the universal ideals 
underlying legal practice in the EU and its Member States because political decision 
making is inextricably linked to a state’s pursuit of its national interest, closer 
analysis unveils the source of such ideals. Although political actors may pursue 
national interest, the legal principles applied to adjudicate such acts operate within 
the legal sphere.63 The legal principles at the EU and national level are informed by 
the same normative principles as acknowledged in the TEU.64 They share a 
commitment to principles of liberty, equality, democracy, the rule of law, liberal 
democratic constitutionalism and self-governance, to the point that new members 
may not be admitted until the they have incorporated these principles domestically.65
 
 
Thus it is these principles, from which the individual legal orders derive, that should 
form the conceptual basis of the resolution of constitutional conflict.  
Having established the constraining principles of this alternate theory, it is now 
necessary to determine how they interact to resolve constitutional conflict. 
Importantly, this theory does not provide judges with a resolution to apply in each 
case, but rather equips them with the conceptual tools necessary to engage with such 
issues in a holistic manner.66
                                                 
59 K. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The making of an international rule of law in Europe, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 60. 
 Thus the principles are not a clash which leads to the 
60 D. Rossa Phelan, Revolt or Revolution, Dublin, Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, p. 430. 
61 Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after 
the Constitutional Treaty, op. cit., p. 286. 
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supremacy of one order over the other. Instead they are to be balanced against one 
another, imbuing in each the relevant degree of importance in the particular case.67
 
  
The value of this theory becomes evident when compared with the traditional 
approach. Rather than conceiving of constitutional conflict as a clash of absolutes in 
which national constitutional supremacy, with its emphasis on certain liberal 
democratic principles, is pitted against the European legal order, based on the 
supranationalism of the rule of law, all these principles are drawn together and 
balanced against each other in a contextually sensitive manner. In this way, the 
benefit derived from the effective and uniform enforcement of EU law is 
incorporated in the strong presumption that national courts are required to enforce 
EU law.68 However, the concern for liberal democratic principles currently expressed 
by national courts, work as a counterweight to the presumption, allowing it to be 
rebutted should the EU law fail to meet the requisite standard. Accordingly, the 
presumption may be rebutted if the EU protection for fundamental rights lacks in 
important respects, if the EU engages in acts which are ultra vires and if an EU law 




Therefore, not only does this theory provide judges with a conceptual toolkit to 
resolve constitutional conflict, but it does so based on a holistic understanding of the 
liberal democratic principles which underpin the EU and Member State legal orders. 
Thus it is a framework which incorporates the concerns of all participants, rather 
than one that requires the domination of a legal order over the other. The 
hierarchical relationship provided for under democratic statism is transformed into a 
sphere of mutual deliberative engagement between all courts, fostering a legal 
network in which conflict is reduced.70
 
  
Although the supremacy of EU law was firmly established by the ECJ by 1978, 
Member States have not embraced the ECJ’s perspective. This paper has sought to 
unravel the jurisprudence in relation to primacy, to ascertain the theoretical 
foundation on which this tension rests. It was argued that the current approach 
adopted by the German FCC is emblematic of the democratic statist position. This 
theory draws on the idea that the constitution is the ultimate legal authority, deriving 
legitimacy from the demos. As such, constitutional conflicts are to be resolved within 
the national constitutional framework, without reference to the European legal 
order. By exposing the weak underpinnings of this conceptual framework, as well as 
its adverse practical consequences, this article sought to demonstrate the need for an 
alternative approach. With the increase in competences being transferred to the EU, 
coupled with the expansion of the Union beyond the Western European nucleus, 
existing tensions are likely to be exacerbated. Therefore a theory in which the 
resolution to conflict is the ultimate domination of one legal order over another, will 
do little to further European coherence and integration. Accordingly it is only by 
drawing on the common normativity of Member States that the currently split sphere 
may be conceptually fused. In challenging the hierarchical approach to constitutional 
conflict, by synthesising all liberal democratic principles into a single package, this 
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alternate paradigm equips judges with the conceptual tools necessary to resolve such 
tensions, thereby creating a sphere of mutual deliberative engagement which in itself 
renders such conflict less likely to occur.
